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…it is no kindness to the workers in a trade to merely turn them out (H.B. Lees Smith: 560) 
Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of minimum wages on average wage earnings in two selected 
countries, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica using a time-series data for the latter and a panel 
data for both. The methodology of GMM time-series estimation is used on the Jamaican data 
(1980-2011) and a Two Stage Least Square Regression model is used for the panel data (1997-
2011).  The impacts of minimum wage on average earnings are mixed. In the time-series model, 
the real minimum wage has a negative and significant impact on the real average earnings, a unit 
change in the minimum wage decreases earnings by $2. However, in the panel model, the 
minimum wage positively impacts the real average wage by the same amount. Thus, the 
minimum wage alone cannot be used to boost average earnings; emphasis needs to be placed on 
the productivity of workers and the cost of doing business in the Caribbean. 
JEL codes: B23, C23, C26, E24 
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1. Introduction 
 The debate on the minimum wage policy especially as it relates to its employment/ 
disemployment effects started in early 1980s with the seminal work of Brown, Gilroy and 
Kowen (1982) who asserted that the labour market at that time was competitive and these 
authors did think it was not logical for firms to pay their workers more when the minimum wage 
rose since such a hike in the minimum wage would act as a disincentive for the employers of 
labour. The relationship between minimum wage and average earnings has been hotly debated by 
labour economists. Especially, since the empirical works of Card and Krueger (1994), Katz and 
Krueger (1992), Hamermesh (2000), Neumark and Wascher (2006), Downes (2000), Addison et 
al (2008), these economists have all contributed immensely to the debate of how an effective 
minimum wage could be designed. More importantly, these erudite scholars critically examine 
the disemployment effects minimum wage has on the economy. An important aspect of the 
minimum wage research is its applications in sociological research, for example, Hamermesh 
found out that beauty has a statistically significant impact on the wage that females are paid.  
 Moreover, researches that deal with minimum wage policy have been restricted to 
county-level, state-level, firm-level panel data analyses using mostly fixed and random effects 
estimation techniques. There is a dearth of research in country-wide panel data estimations and 
greater emphasis has been placed on the theoretical construct of the minimum wage. Few 
economists have actually made use of other estimation techniques to empirically test the 
relationship between average earnings and minimum wage.  
This study has been deemed necessary as an attempt to bridge the gap that has been left 
open by labour economists in the Caribbean because it attempts to investigate the endogeneity 
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bias minimum wage has on real average earnings and seeks avenues through the use of GMM 
and TSLS to overcome such a problem. First, all the variables are deflated with the consumer 
price index to express them in real terms and to be able to analyze the real impact of minimum 
wage, conditioned on the its lags, the lags of other independent variables, some interaction terms 
and square terms, on average earnings. The results derived when this is done are mixed, in the 
GMM time-series model, the minimum wage positively impacts the average earnings and in the 
two- stage least squares model, average earnings fall when the minimum wage changes. This 
indicates that a policy instrument such as minimum wage cannot be used at this time to reduce 
poverty, unemployment or boost income. Greater emphasis has to be placed by the Government 
of Jamaica on reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio, improving productivity and inducing workers to 
choose appropriate levels of effort.  
However, it could be said that if both Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago pool resources 
together, the minimum wage along with other welfare-improving policies, should be used to 
raise real average earnings in both countries, but the possibility of such cooperation is limited at 
this time.  The government of the twin-islands of Trinidad and Tobago may not accept to pay 
down some of the debt owed by the Jamaican government consequently a possibility of debt 
reduction arrangements between both countries is not feasible. 
  The study is divided into five sections, section one deals with the introduction of the 
study, section 2 reviews relevant literature, section 3 looks at the model  specification and data 
sources, section 4 attempts to empirically test the model and offer economic explanations for the 
results. Section 5 concludes the paper and makes stylized recommendations. An appendix is 
included at the end of the paper where the estimation methods are discussed; also, kernel density 
graphs, descriptive statistics and correlation matrices are added. 
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Section 2: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
 The literature on the impact of minimum wage went as far back as the 1980s when there 
was just an orthodox view about the correlation between minimum wage and earnings. Most of 
the studies agreed that there was indeed a disemployment effect brought about by increases in 
the minimum wage. Most of the analyses were done for counties in the U.S., manufacturing sub-
sectors such as the beer industry, retail sectors, and some target groups who were directly 
affected by minimum wage policies for example youths, production workers and shop assistants. 
Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982) found that there was a modest but statistically significant 
negative effect of minimum wage on employment using a time-series data to test the impact of 
minimum wage on youth employment and unemployment (Edagbami, 2006). Panel studies that 
were done in the 1990s to the 2000s challenged some of the findings especially as it relates to the 
impact minimum wage has on unemployment although there has not been a consensus on the 
employment/disemployment effects of minimum wages. 
 Overall, there have been mixed results in the literature on minimum wages, employment 
and earnings. Addison, Blackburn and Cotti (2008) find little evidence of disemployment effects 
in the United States, rather they admit that their results suggest positive employment effects of 
minimum wage, the fixed effect estimation framework these authors use shows that a 10% 
increase in the minimum wage is estimated to generate  1-2% increase in employment in the 
sectors considered. Oswald and Blanchflower (2006) are the first to empirical prove that the 
wage curve elasticity (logarithm of unemployment with respect to the logarithm of the average 
earnings) of -0.1 applies to counties in the US and European Union member countries, more 
importantly, they allude to the fact that non-competitive theories of labour market validate the 
negative relationship between unemployment and average earnings. They use a simple analogy: 
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“if unemployment is high and firms decide not to increase the wages of their workers, workers 
would not give up their jobs because they know jobs do not exist elsewhere, therefore these 
workers have to settle for low wages”. Neumark and Wascher (2006) review several studies on 
the link between minimum wages, earnings and employment and report that in spite of the fact 
that the orthodox theory of minimum wage has not been in tandem with current findings, there is 
still no consensus concerning the wage-employment nexus.  
Downes (2000) specifies a dynamic labour demand function which takes into 
consideration regulations in the labour market, labour cost (wage) and other non-regulatory 
measures for Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, he asserts using co-integration and 
error-correction modelling that all the variables have long run relationships. 
 Hamermesh and Biddle (1993) add a new twist to the minimum wage literature by 
empirically testing the correlation of beauty with the rate of pay, the authors assert that better 
looking people are more likely to sort into occupations where beauty is likely to be more 
productive. They find that 9% of working men in the United States who are viewed as being 
below average in terms of looks are penalized about 10% in hourly earnings, 32% of men who 
are viewed as above average in looks receive earnings premium of 5%. For women, the penalty 
for bad looks (among the lowest 8% of working women) is 5%. Overall, there is 7 to 10% 
penalty for being in the lowest 10% in terms of looks among all workers and 5% premium for 
being in the top 30%.  
Aaronson, D., et al (2009) affirm that following a minimum wage hike, households buy 
vehicles. However, vehicle purchases increase faster than income among impacted households. 
The size, timing, distribution and composition of spending response are not in tandem with 
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certainty equivalent life cycle model. The response is however consistent with a model in which 
households face collateral constraints. Spending response is too large to be consistent with the 
permanent income hypothesis. Moreover, the authors confirm that a $1 increase in the minimum 
wage raises spending by over $800 in the near term, this exceeds roughly $300 per quarter 
increase in family income following a minimum wage increase of similar size. All told, 
minimum wage hikes increase lifetime income by roughly $1500. If households were spreading 
that income gain over their lifetimes, the short-run spending increase should be an order of 
magnitude smaller than what is actually observed.   
Moreover, Aaronson, et al (2009) further state that so long as minimum wage hikes are 
known in advance, the permanent income hypothesis implies that minimum wage earning 
households should increase spending before the hike. However, if households are unable to 
borrow against future income in order to finance current spending, spending will not rise until 
the minimum wage increases. The authors find that the minimum wage has small effects on 
income and spending of workers making 120 to 200% of the minimum wage and no effect on 
workers who are earning at least double of the minimum wage. In their closing remarks, the 
authors ascertain that minimum wage increases only have large effects on the incomes of 
minimum wage workers, at least in the short-run 
Cotti and Tefft (2012), employing a two stage least squares regression function, use the 
minimum wage to control for the effects of rising food prices in the US on obesity and they find 
that fast food price changes do not necessarily affect BMI (Body Mass Index) or obesity 
prevalence. Aaronson (2001) is quoted by the authors, he demonstrates that there may be lagged 
effects of minimum wage changes on fast food prices in accordance with theories which state 
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that firm output prices may not instantaneously respond to input costs. This justifies the inclusion 
of lagged and contemporaneous minimum wage. 
Maloney and Mendez (2003) purport that the minimum wage impacts beyond those 
contemplated in the advanced countries. The authors agree with Neumark (2001) who 
empirically shows that earned incomes of low-wage workers decrease and poverty actually 
increases when there is a hike in the minimum wage. Kernel estimators are used by these authors 
to investigate the nature of wage distribution functions for Brazil, Chile and some other Latin 
American countries. 
Porter and Vitek (2003) assert that the increase in the minimum wage affecting only 20% 
of employees would amplify output volatility by 0.2% to 9.2% and employment volatility by -
1.2% to 7.8%. A fixed wage or indexation to unit labour cost or wage inflation is preferable, 
largely protecting the flexibility of the labour market. A Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium model
2
 is employed by the authors which depicts that government needs to balance 
the design of a minimum wage policy with several other factors such as inflation, 
competitiveness, business operations and employment. Hong Kong SAR is considerably exposed 
to shocks transmitted via trade and financial channels and for the economy to be flexible enough; 
asset prices and the product market must not be perturbed. The same thing could be said of 
Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, because these are small-island economies that have large 
exposures to external shocks. 
                                                          
2
 The DSGE model features short-run nominal price and wage rigidities generated by monopolistic competition, 
staggered re-optimization, and partial indexation in the output and labour markets. Staggered wage setting is 
applicable to high-skilled individuals who have monopoly power in the labour market while those with low skills 
are subject to the minimum wage.  
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 The main argument in Porter and Vitek’s article is that the minimum wage should be 
introduced in a way that aids domestic price flexibility. Skilled individuals participate in flexible 
labour market, unskilled persons are paid a binding legislated minimum wage thus they 
essentially do not have much bargaining power. The skilled persons can often optimize the 
wages they are paid regularly to reflect their marginal product. There are five types of minimum 
indexation considered by the authors, these include: no indexation (fixed minimum wage), 
indexation to aggregate wage inflation, indexation to unit labour cost, indexation to consumer 
price inflation and average labour productivity growth.  
Moreover, Porter and Vitek (2003) further assert that inequality needs to be considered in 
improving the efficacy of the minimum wage. “A minimum wage does not with certainty mean 
inequality will fall, it might remain high”. This is evident in Hong Kong SAR and similar 
sentiments could be expressed for countries like Jamaica and T&T. Income distribution in Hong 
Kong is bimodal reflecting apparent segmentation in the country between skilled and unskilled 
labour. Also, T&T and Jamaica have bimodal income distribution curves as well (Kernel density 
curves in the appendix). Introducing a minimum wage without indexing it is estimated to inflate 
business cycle volatility by 9.2% at 20% coverage level and employment by 6.6%.  However, 
indexation of the minimum wage to aggregate wage inflation restores output and labour market 
efficiency more rapidly in response to shocks than alternative mechanisms. The authors, in their 
concluding remarks, note that by lessening income inequality, introducing a minimum wage may 
be expected to promote social stability. However, by reducing labour market flexibility, it also 
has the potential to elevate macroeconomic volatility and distort dynamic response of the 
economy to shocks. Choosing the minimum wage is a social choice and must be supplemented 
with welfare payments to provide poor families with additional support.  
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 Based on analysis of micro-founded employment functions in contrast to predictions of 
the textbook analysis; Ragacs (2003) shows in his article that no significant negative effect of 
minimum wages on employment is found. Focusing on human capital formation, minimum 
wages could internalize parts of the external effects yielding increased skills accumulation 
inducing higher economic growth, and in some models, even increased employment. The author 
makes use of co-integration analysis. High correlation is found between minimum wage and 
average wages. 
 Wallis (2002) uses a simultaneous equation model and Zellner’s seemingly unrelated 
equations approach to investigate the impact of skill shortages on real wage growth and 
unemployment. It is confirmed that skill shortages have a significant positive effect on the real 
wage growth and a negative effect on unemployment. 
 Wilson (2012) empirically shows that minimum wage policies stifle job opportunities for 
low-skilled workers, youths and minorities which are groups policymakers often try to help with 
these policies. If government requires that certain workers be paid higher wages, then businesses 
make adjustments for the added costs, such as reducing hiring, cutting employee work hours, 
reducing benefits and charging higher prices. The author further asserts that many minimum 
wage workers live in families with incomes above the poverty level and there are some working 
poor persons who actually earn above the minimum wage, thus targeting poor persons with a 
minimum wage policy must be done with care.  
In addition, Wallis puts forward three theories that have, over the years, explored the 
effects of minimum wages, these include: monopsony, competitive and institutional.  In 
summary, the competitive theory of minimum wage asserts that a higher minimum wage draws 
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high-skilled workers into the market with the prospect of earning such a wage, this leads to a 
decrease in the employment which consequently shuts out the lower-skilled persons. In the 
monopsony model, there are few big firms who have monopoly power thus they face an upward 
sloping supply curve of labour, such firms have the right discretion in setting wages. Also, the 
institutional model looks at the costs of minimum wage increases which are generally offset by 
reducing organizational slack and increasing productivity, costs that cannot be absorbed by firms 
are passed on to customers through high prices. 
Zavodny (1998) asserts that several time series studies of the minimum wage effects on 
teen employment rates do not find that higher wages are associated with significantly lower 
employment rates (Neumark and Wascher, 2006; Card, Katz and Krueger, 1994, Wellington, 
1991). However, Brown, Gilroy and Cohen (1982) confirm that teen employment rates fell at 
least by 1% when the minimum wage rises by 10%. More so, Card and Krueger (1995) further 
validate the result of the latter (Brown, Gilroy and Kohen’s results) by suggesting that 
methodological problems biased the results in earlier studies.  Zavodny further corroborates his 
argument by stressing that when employment falls, GDP falls and prices rise and if the demand 
curve for labour is inelastic, price increases offset the fall in employment as a result of wage 
increase. 
Acemoglu (1996) asserts, using a search-theoretic modelling framework, that the 
composition of jobs improve considerably in response to higher minimum wages and generous 
unemployment benefits consequently improving welfare. He however points out that the 
composition of jobs is always suboptimal and that there are too many low wage/bad jobs. 
Different types of jobs have different capital costs and those which cost more will have to pay 
higher wages due to rent-sharing and therefore good and bad jobs always exist in the economy. 
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In an unregulated labour market, the composition of jobs is biased towards bad jobs. The reason 
for this inefficiency is that good jobs cost more to create but firms do not necessarily receive the 
full marginal product of their investments because with higher productivity, they have to pay 
higher wages.  
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) argue that equilibrium unemployment could always to be 
used as a device of ensuring that workers do not shirk while working. They argue that in the 
competitive paradigm, all workers are paid at the ‘going wage’ and if a worker shirks and is 
fired, he can easily be rehired by another firm and there is no penalty for his misdemeanour. 
However, if a firm raises wages above the ‘going wage’ and one of its workers shirks, such a 
worker faces a heavy penalty and he or she will therefore not shirk. Moreover, if a firm raises its 
wages, it will benefit other firms to do the same and the no-shirking incentive disappears again. 
Once all firms raise wages, the demand for labour falls and workers do not have an incentive to 
shirk because if they are caught shirking and fired, they cannot immediately find jobs elsewhere. 
Yellen (1984) does a critique of the literature of efficiency-wage models of unemployment and 
also looks at the micro-foundations of the efficiency wage model such as adverse selection and 
labour turnover. She asserts that if labour productivity depends on real wage then cutting wages 
may raise labour costs 
Gindling and Terrell (2011) use individual-level panel data to study the impact of legal 
changes in minimum wage on a host of other labour market outcomes such as transitions into and 
out of poverty, wages and employment and transition of workers across jobs. These economists 
purport that changes in the minimum wage only affect those workers whose income level before 
the change is close to the minimum. Also, the estimates from the employment transition the two 
authors obtain show a decrease in covered private sector employment due to the combination of 
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layoffs and reductions in hiring. Moreover, these two authors admit increases in the legal 
minimum wage raise the probability that a poor worker’s family move out of poverty if such 
increases impact the head of the household rather than the non-head.  
Raff and Summers (1987) purported that an introduction of a $5 day programme in 1914 
by Henry Ford validated the efficiency wage theory and this substantially lowered absenteeism, 
turnover and increased productivity and consequently profits.  
According to Bellante (1994), the concept of efficiency wage posits a positive 
relationship between wages and productivity over some range. Up to some point, raising wages 
might lower per unit cost. What inevitably motivates workers is the extent to which the wage at 
the firm in question exceeds wages obtainable elsewhere that is the market wage conditioned on 
the probability of obtaining it. If a firm faces a decrease in demand, it will not take advantage of 
the seeming opportunity to reduce the wage cost because lowering such cost will eventually raise 
its per unit cost. The level of unemployment is not even affected by the shape of the demand 
curve for labour- only the average wage level is affected by its shape.  
Bellante (1994) further supports his argument by pointing out that real wages have 
actually doubled without consequential impact on average unemployment rates. The wage (w) to 
which workers compare their received wage is the wage rate elsewhere (also w) but discounted 
by the probability of receiving it (1-u) where (u) is the unemployment rate. In this manner, the 
wage, w, can be uniform across firms and workers can still receive a premium that will induce 
them to avoid shirking and stay with the firm.  
Ryska and Prusa (2012) believe that if the labour markets are modeled as fully 
heterogeneous, involuntary unemployment does not follow. The two authors believe that even 
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though the two-efficiency wage models, Solow’s (1979) generic efficiency wage model and 
Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) shirking model differ in the degree of wage rigidity, they both lead to 
involuntary unemployment. However, Ryska and Prusa empirically prove that there is no 
voluntary unemployment because of the following reasons: One, price per unit of effort (that is 
effort wage) at which workers can compete is a voluntary decision based on their preferences. 
Given that the effort function is fully determined by workers’ preferences, there exists no room 
for voluntary unemployment. Equilibrium must be attained insofar as the neoclassical 
assumptions in the individual submarkets are met. This is not to say that fractions do not exist in 
these markets. It is merely to show that effort or quality variations of labour do not generate 
disequilibrium. 
Carmichael (1985) affirms that workers who do not work at  w* can simply post a bond 
to pay for their jobs, this reduces their valuation of the job and so they  are indifferent between 
working and being unemployed therefore unemployment is involuntary. Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1985) provide an answer to Carmichael’s question of the existence of involuntary 
unemployment. They argue that entry fees lead to a double moral hazard problem. Individuals 
will be concerned about putting money up front, less the firm take their money and either fire 
them or make their jobs so unpleasant to induce them to quit. 
Meer and West (2012) assert that the effect of minimum wage should be more apparent 
in employment dynamics than levels. Minimum wage reduces gross hiring of new employees, 
but there is no effect on gross separations; increases in legal minimum wage reduce job growth. 
Yellen (1984) reviews the dual labour markets theory of efficiency wage and shows that 
in the primary sector, the efficiency wage hypothesis holds, job rationing and voluntary payment 
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of workers by firms of wages in excess of market clearing are features of this sector. However, in 
the secondary sector, where the wage-productivity nexus is weak or non-existent, there should be 
observed a fairly neoclassical behaviour. The market in the secondary sector therefore clears and 
people can take up jobs easily albeit at a lower wage. The existence of the secondary sector does 
not, however, eliminate involuntary unemployment (Hall, 1975) because the wage differential 
between the primary and the secondary sector jobs will induce unemployment among job seekers 
who seek to wait for primary-sector job openings. 
Hall (2003) develops a wage friction model (a friction can be interpreted in terms of 
wage norm that provides the equilibrium selection function) where he supports the sticky-wage 
model of fluctuations. The friction in his model arises in an economic equilibrium and satisfies 
the condition that no worker-employer pair has an unexploited opportunity for mutual 
improvement. Hall further states that the friction neither interferes with the efficient formation of 
job matches nor causes inefficient job losses. When the wage is relatively high – closer to the 
employer’s maximum--- the employer anticipates loss of surplus from new matches and puts 
correspondingly less effort into recruiting workers. Jobs become hard to find, unemployment 
rises and employment falls. The friction is plausible because it occurs only within the range 
where the wage does not block efficient bargain from being struck and maintained. The outcome 
of the bargain between worker and employer is fundamentally indeterminate and the wage 
friction is an equilibrium selection mechanism.  
Zenou and Jellal (1999) introduce the quality of job matching into the effort function in 
order to calculate the efficiency wage. There are two cases that allow the evaluation of the 
impact of job matching on the effort function to be done. In the first case, the authors consider a 
condition where the quality of the match is perfectly observable by the firm and it is shown that 
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the equilibrium unemployment level is due to both high wages and mismatch. In the second case, 
job matching is a random variable that is (nature picks what it will be) and it is shown that there 
are some regions in which the efficiency wage generates an effort greater than the initial wage 
and others where the reverse is the case.  
Akerlof and Yellen (1986) purport that there is a positive relationship between wage and 
effort; this implies that firms can exactly measure the impact of their wage setting on effort. 
Profit maximizing firms set an efficiency wage such that the effort-wage elasticity is unity 
(Solow, 1979). Employment level is determined by setting this efficiency wage to marginal 
productivity of labour e (w*) F’ (e (w*, N) = w*, where, e, is the effort, w is the going wage, N 
is the total supply of labour. e(w*) is independent of the firm’s technology, equality of labour 
supply and demand and the structure of the product market. It is only determined by productivity 
and efficiency. 
Zenou and Jellal (1999) however argue that if jobs are simple so that job matching is 
rather good, firms can perfectly motivate their workers by using pecuniary compensations in this 
case (efficiency wages) such that the effort-wage elasticity is equal to one; unemployment is too 
high and wages are rigid downward. However, if jobs are complex, the job matching is less 
obvious and the firm has to use non-pecuniary attributes of the job to motivate workers. Effort-
wage elasticity is less than one; however, since a job is mostly defined by its technology which is 
in general not under firms’ control (at least in the short run) firms just have to motivate workers 
by using only monetary compensations. In addition, the authors advocate that firms need not set 
wages too high since they cannot evaluate the consequences of their wage policy on the workers’ 
motivation. Effort-elasticity of wage is lower than or greater than one depending on the trade-off 
between effort and marginal productivity, marginal effort and marginal productivity. 
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Lazear (1981) shows, in providing a way out of the involuntary unemployment trap, that 
the use of seniority wages solves the incentive to work problem; in his model, he argues that 
initially workers are initially paid less than their marginal productivity and as they work harder 
or work effectively over time within the firm, earnings increase until they exceed marginal 
productivity. The upward tilt in the earnings profile provides the incentive to avoid shirking and 
the present-value of wages can fall to the market clearing level consequently avoiding 
involuntary unemployment.  However, this creates a moral hazard problem on the employer’s 
side because a firm can declare falsely that a worker shirks or a firm may lay off old workers 
(paid above marginal product) and hire new workers at a lower wage (credibility problem). 
Moreover, the seriousness of the moral hazard problem depends on the extent to which effort can 
be monitored by external auditors which may discipline employers from cheating. Reputation 
and credibility effects can do the same job as well.  
Leonard (1999) argues that minimum wage research has come to be a test of the 
applicability of neoclassical price theory to the determination of wages and employment. The 
modern minimum wage controversy is not just a technical quarrel about the sign and magnitude 
of wage-elasticity coefficients; it is according to the author, the latest chapter in a long 
methodological discourse over whether and in which domains neoclassical theory can be applied. 
More importantly, the author asserts that welfare effects depend on wage elasticity of demand. 
Some workers will receive higher wages and be better off while other workers whose product is 
less than the new minimum will be laid off, or will work for fewer hours. In his words, “if the 
quantity of labour refers to employment, then the wage gains of those who keep their jobs must 
be traded off against the wage losses of those who lose their jobs”. 
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Schmitt and Rosnick (2011) use Card and Krueger’s studies of the 1992 New Jersey state 
minimum wage increase. Their results show, for fast food, food services, retail and low wage 
establishments in San Francisco and Santa Fe, that city-wide minimum wage increase can raise 
the earnings of low-wage workers, without a discernible impact on their employment.  
Rosen and Moen (2006) argue that efficiency wages and unemployment may arise in 
equilibrium when output is contractible. In their model, firms offer wage contracts to workers 
who have private information about their match-specific productivity and effort choice. Firms 
face a trade-off between inducing more effort and conceding rents. Because hiring is costly, 
firms choose a contract such that workers with below a maximum match-specific productivity 
remain employed. The infra-marginal workers obtain information rents and these rents translate 
to equilibrium unemployment because they do not have any social value in equilibrium as these 
rents are offset by the corresponding social cost of unemployment. 
Shimer, Rogerson and Wright (2004) survey search-theoretic models of labour markets 
and discuss their usefulness in the analysis of labour market dynamics, labour turnover and 
wages. Emphasis is placed by these authors on job creation, job destruction and wages. 
These are just a few of the large  literature on the employment and disemployment effects of the 
minimum wage. 
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Section 3: Methodology, Model Specification and Data Sources (Generalized Method of 
Moments and Two Stage Least Squares) 
a. Two- Stage Least Squares (TSLS) 
An important assumption of regression analysis is that the right hand side variables or the 
regressors are uncorrelated with the error term; if this assumption is violated, OLS (Ordinary 
Least Squares) and WLS (Weighted Least Squares) estimates become biased and inconsistent. 
Two things might make the error term to be correlated with the independent variables: one, if the 
independent variables are endogenous and two, if the independent variables are measured with 
the error term. The problem of endogeneity of the independent variables can be solved by 
introducing instrumental variables that are truly exogenous that is E(Z, u) = 0 such that Z and X 
are n x k matrices; however, these instrumental variables must be correlated with the endogenous 
independent variables that is E (Z1...Zn, X1....Xn) ≠ 0. The instrumental variables
i
 are then used to 
eliminate the correlation between the right-hand side variables and the disturbances. As the name 
(TSLS) suggests, there are two distinct stages of regressions involved. First, an OLS regression 
of each of the variable (endogenous) is done on the set of instruments. The second stage is a 
regression of the original equation with all the variables (independent) replaced by the fitted 
values from the  first stage of regressions. The outcome of these two simultaneous regressions 
produces the TSLS estimates. 
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Formal Representation of the TSLS 
Let Z represent a matrix of instruments and let Y and X be the dependent and independent 
variables respectively. X and Z are both n x k matrices and Y is a n x 1 matrix. Then the 
coefficients computed in the two-stages are given by: 
))())(( 111 YZZZZXXZZZZXb
TSLS
   
Where the Z-terms represent the projector matrix
3
 xxxx  1)( . The estimated covariance 
matrix of the coefficients is given by: 
112 ))('(   XZZZZXs  where 2s  is the estimated residual variance (square of the standard 
error of the TSLS regression). 
b. Generalized Method of Moments4 
The starting point of GMM estimation is a theoretical relation that the parameters should 
satisfy. The aim of GMM modelling is to choose the parameter estimates so that the theoretical 
relation is satisfied as “closely as possible”. The theoretical relation has to be replaced by its 
sample counterpart and the estimators are then chosen to minimize the weighted distance 
between the theoretical and actual values. GMM is a robust estimator because unlike MLE, it 
does not need the information about the exact disturbances and it encapsulates the 
heteroskedasticity, unit root and autocorrelation tests
5
. The theoretical relation that the 
                                                          
3
 This shows that the x’s (endogenous variables) are regressed on the instruments. 
4
 More details are provided in the appendix 
5
 A Dynamic GMM model simultaneously uses the differences of the variables if non-stationarity occurs and also 
does check for othorgonality problems. Othorgonality means a transpose of a vector (k x1) multiplied by another 
vector with the same dimension yields a scalar (zero). Cross –section and period panel corrected standard errors 
are used to ensure standard errors are robust. 
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parameters should satisfy are usually othorgonality conditions between some possibly (non-
linear) function of parameters )(f  and a set of instrumental variables Zt : 0))(( ZfE   , 
this is the orthogonality condition. The GMM therefore selects parameter estimates that ensure 
the sample correlations between the instruments and the function f as defined by the criterion 
function which is: )())(()(  AmmJ  where )(m = Zf )(  and A is a weighting 
matrix, is strong. Thus ZAfZfJ )())(()(   . Any symmetric positive definite matrix 
will yield consistent estimate of q. However, a necessary but not sufficient method to obtain an 
(asymptotically) efficient estimate of q is to set the weighting matrix to the inverse of the 
covariance matrix of sample moments (m) 
An Hausmann test has to be performed to decide on which model (FE or RE) would be 
desirable. The null hypothesis of a random effect is tested against a fixed effect, if the Chi-
Square coefficient is greater than 1 and the probability is less than 0.05, a fixed effects model 
must be used if not a random effect model becomes handy. 
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Section 3(c): The Model and Data Sources
6
 
 For a proper model specification to be done, we have to take into consideration the fact 
that the minimum wage might impact the average earnings, unemployment and GDP with a lag 
as discussed by the economists whose works are reviewed in this study. The reasons for the lag 
in response of minimum wage to average earnings and the other variables are as follows: 
1. Firms do not instantaneously respond to a minimum wage hike by increasing prices and 
this may distort labour market flexibility. 
2. Theories have shown that unemployment rates rise when the minimum wage increases 
but this cannot happen instantaneously; there is a likelihood of slow response due to 
firm’s capacity to absorb costs and productivity. 
3. Interactions can take place between some of the variables; it is possible for the real GDP 
to influence the minimum wage and for the business cycle (proxied by the GDP) to 
impact unemployment rate. 
4. Some of the variables may not necessarily be linear. Studies have shown that GDP, 
unemployment rate may be quadratic, thus including square terms could correct for 
biasedness in the parameter estimates. 
For the time-series GMM model: 
ttttttt ARUERMWUERGDPRMWRAWE   )1(* 54321 7 
                                                          
6
 RMW, RAWE, RGDP are real minimum wage, real average wage and real GDP respectively in J$ while UE 
represents unemployment. RMWUS, RAWEUS, RGDPUS represent the aforementioned variables respectively in 
US$. 
7
 The constant parameter is omitted from the model, the goodness of fit statistic is therefore not interpreted. The 
GMM model has been corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the Heteroskedasticity 
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The Instruments used are : two lags each of the real minimum wage, real average wage earnings 
and unemployment rate. The a-priori expectations are 1 , 2  > 0, 3 < 0, 4  and 5 > 0 ; in 
other words, changes in the real minimum wage and the real GDP are expected to increase the 
real average wage earnings while a change in the unemployment rate will likely lead to a decline 
in the real average warnings over time. Also, the interaction term between real minimum wage 
and unemployment is expected to be positive to correct for the bias in the sign of unemployment. 
For the panel model:  
ititit XY    
Where Y represents the dependent variable, i and t represent cross-sections and time 
respectively. In our model i = 2 and t = 30
8
.  X is the number of independent variables in the 
model and  is the disturbance term which also has a cross-section dimension. X is a n x k 
matrix, Y is a n x 1 matrix and the disturbance term is also a n x 1 matrix.  
For the TSLS model
9
: 
it
ititititititit RGDPUSRMWUSUEUERMWUSRGDPUSRAWEUS



 *524321
 
The a-priori expectations are similar to those of the GMM model except that 4  > 0 and 
5 < 0 and these two coefficients are expected to be statistically significant to correct for the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Autocorrelation Correction option (HAC). In addition, Pre-Whitening runs a preliminary VAR(1) model prior to 
estimation to remove the correlations in the moment conditions. 
8
 The sample size should have been larger than 30, however, a minimum wage legislation in Trinidad and Tobago 
did not come into effect until 1997 and a fixed minimum wage has been used since then.  
9
 The instruments are: RAWEUS(2 lags), RMWUS(2 lags), RMWUS*RGDPUS(an interaction term between these two 
variables), RGDP
2
 (a quadratic term), RMWUS*RGDPUS, RGDPUS
2
, RMWUS*UE, UE
2
, RAWEUS
2
. The standard 
errors are made robust using the Period- weights Panel Corrected Standard Errors and Covariance (PCSE) 
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upward bias in unemployment and downward bias in the real GDP. As it will be shown later the 
square and interaction terms ensure that the a-priori expectations hold. 
The data of the minimum wage in Trinidad and Tobago come directly from the Ministry 
of Labour, Small and Micro-Enterprise; however the Jamaican data are derived from the 
Statistical Institute of Jamaica. The average wage earnings index is an all industry index (food 
processing, drink and tobacco, textile garments and footwear; printing, publishing and paper 
converters; assembly-type and related industries and others). The AWE data in Jamaica are 
derived from Earnings in Major Establishments Report while the Trinidadian data come from the 
Central Statistical Office, Abstract of Statistics. 
The gross domestic product at market prices is the total value added output of all sectors 
plus taxes less subsidies. The Jamaican and the Trinidadian data come from index mundi, a data 
portal that gathers facts and statistics from multiple sources and turns them into easy to use 
visuals. Also to derive the consumer price index, one calculates the prices of the basket of goods 
households purchase and uses a base year to deflate the data in order to account for inflation. The 
CPI index for both countries is derived from CSO office and STATIN office. Unemployment 
rate data for Trinidad and Tobago are derived from Index Mundi and the Jamaican data are 
adopted from Labour Force Statistics (various editions) at the Statistical Institute of Jamaica. 
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Section Four: Model Estimation and Interpretation of Results 
Table 1: The GMM Time-Series Model 
Dependent Variable: RAWE 
Variable Coefficient Standard error T-Value Significance 
RGDP  6.4359*
10
 1.8468 3.4848 0.0018 
RMW -1.4619* 0.5573 -2.6231 0.0146 
UE -22.6899**
11
 45.5299 -0.4984 0.6226 
RMW*UE  0.2121* 0.0516 4.1122 0.0004 
AR(1)  0.2741* 0.1096 2.5015 0.0193 
J-Statistic  0.1198*   Null hypothesis 
of exogeneity of 
the instruments 
accepted  
Durbin Watson  1.9890    
Source: Author’s computations 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Significant at 1% significance level 
11
 Not significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels. 
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Table 2: The TSLS Panel Data Model 
Effect Specification: Cross section fixed (dummy variables) 
Dependent Variable: RAWE 
Variable  Coefficient Standard error T-Value Significance 
RGDPUS 0.000734** 0.009013 0.081426 0.9360 
RMWUS 2.048578* 0.365614 5.603118 0.0000 
UE -28.13754* 10.52452 -2.673522 0.0150 
UE
2
 1.537513* 0.435514 3.530342 0.0022 
RMWUS*RGDPUS -0.000117** 0.000165 -0.707361 0.4879 
Durbin Watson 1.503574    
Instrument Rank 11.00000    
Standard error of 
coefficient 
10.89444    
Source: Author’s computations 
Economic Implications of Results 
 From the GMM estimation results, a unit change in the real minimum wage yields a 
decrease of J$2 in the mean of the real average earnings (even though nominal wages may rise) 
when all the other explanatory variables are zero, this indicates that a hike in the minimum wage 
increases the costs of Jamaican firms who already face huge cost constraints. It is therefore not 
surprising that, due to the inability of firms to absorb costs, such costs are passed on to 
consumers who could be the workers in form of high prices; this reduces the purchasing power 
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of their earnings. This indicates that workers who are in the production and ancillary sub-sectors 
earn less directly because Jamaican firms reduce their income and indirectly such workers and 
the average Jamaican consumer will have to expend more on goods and services. In addition, the 
IMF agreement that is still not in place has led to the continuous slide of the Jamaican dollar 
because of the government’s inability to source for funds for development from bilateral and 
multilateral institutions, the consequence of this is that net international reserves have been on a 
downward trajectory and firms’ import costs have gone up, this neutralizes the positive impact of 
an increase in minimum wage if introduced. 
 In addition, a unit change in the real GDP produces approximately $6 boost in real 
average earnings. This is clearly expected; high real income raises real average earnings and as 
the economy grows in real terms average incomes grow in real terms as well. However, just a $6 
increase in the real average earnings given a change in the real GDP is too minute because the 
Government of Jamaica spends a lot on servicing debt and paying for capital goods. The first 
attempt at running the GMM, without an interaction term between unemployment and real 
minimum wage, shows that a unit change in the unemployment rate increases real average wage, 
this result does not lend itself to economic theory. However, the inclusion of an interaction term 
between the real minimum wage and unemployment corrects for this bias. After the inclusion of 
the interaction term, a unit change in the unemployment rate does not affect the real average 
earnings. 
 The problem of autocorrelation in the GMM model, after using HAC and Pre-Whitening 
options, makes it mandatory to include an AR(1) (Autoregressive process of order (1) to correct 
the positive correlated errors. The AR(1) coefficient is indeed statistically significant. From the 
Panel Two Stage Least Squares, the real GDP, conditional on an interaction term between the 
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real GDP and the real minimum wage, has a minute positive but insignificant impact on the real 
average wage in both countries when the data are pooled together. A unit change in the real GDP 
does not have any impact on the real average wage. This clearly shows that a high real GDP does 
not guarantee that real average earnings will increase in both countries, it all depends on how 
productive and efficient firms and workers are. In terms of the real minimum wage, a unit change 
in this variable brings about a US$2 dollar increase in the real average wage when the other 
explanatory variables are zero. This clearly indicates that Jamaican and Trinidadian production 
workers and shop keepers who earn below the average wage will see a boost of $2 in their 
average wage following a minimum wage hike if implemented. In addition, the governments of 
both countries need not contemplate about raising the minimum wage now. Boosting the 
productive capacity of firms and improving workers’ productivity is a more attractive policy 
measure that should be introduced now and then a minimum wage policy may be used thereafter. 
 When a preliminary TSLS model without a square unemployment term was executed, a 
unit change in the unemployment rate raises real average wage, but when I introduce a square 
term, the upward bias of the unemployment coefficient is corrected. A unit change in 
unemployment rate yields a US$28 decrease in the real average wage; this decrease clearly 
outweighs just a US$2 increase in the real average wage following a unit change in the minimum 
wage. Consequently, targeting the unemployment rate is a more viable option for the 
governments of Trinidad & Tobago and Jamaica rather than raising the wage floor, raising the 
minimum wage could actually increase the unemployment rate as predicted by the competitive 
theory. 
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Section V: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations for Further Studies 
 The analyses done so far have shown that there are mixed results about the impact of a 
minimum wage policy on average earnings. The GMM estimation shows a unit change in the 
real minimum wage reduces average earnings of workers in Jamaica; however, the Two Stage 
Least Squares regression results indicate that real average earnings in both countries actually 
increase as the minimum wage rises. The question that must be raised is why is there a disparity 
in the effects of the minimum wage? One obvious answer is that Jamaica had been using the 
minimum wage since the 1980s but Trinidad just started using this policy in 1997 and more so, 
because the Jamaican economy is not as big as the Trinidadian economy. In addition, firms in 
both countries have different capacities of absorbing the costs of a minimum wage hike. In 
Jamaica, firms are already cost-strapped but Trinidadian firms have larger capacities and more 
resources at their disposal to absorb the sudden surprise of a wage hike. Trinidad has oil and 
refineries but Jamaica imports oil, consequently firms in Trinidad can decide to pay their 
workers more when minimum wage rises and still make reasonable profit but Jamaican firms 
will simply respond to such hike by cutting back on employment immediately. This difference in 
averseness to a minimum wage hike in both countries is therefore not surprising. 
It is recommended that this study be replicated for other Caribbean countries in order to 
fully come to an agreement about the overall effect of minimum wage on real average earnings 
in the Caribbean. Two, unemployment rates in both countries must fall for workers to realize a 
reasonable increase in their real average earnings. The inflation rates in Jamaica and Trinidad 
have to be kept lower than they are presently to hedge against a slide in the purchasing power of 
consumers in both countries. Firms must also reduce organizational slack and improve their 
29 
 
efficiency and productivity. Real GDP growth has been at low ebb in Jamaica, urgent action is 
needed to reverse this trend so that the growth rate of real average income can be sustained. 
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APPENDICES 
 
The generalized method of moments was made popular by Hansen (1982) who showed 
that the basic idea underlying the GMM was to obtain a set of moment conditions that the 
parameter of interest θ should satisfy. These conditions are denoted as: 
0)),(( ymE  
The method of moments estimator is replaced with its sample analog: 
0/)),((  Tym
t
t   * 
The condition in equation * will not be satisfied for any θ if there are more restrictions (m) than 
are parameters θ. To allow for such over-identification, the GMM is defined by minimizing the 
following criteria function: 
)()(),( ,,  tt
t
t ymyAym ------- (1) 
Equation 1 estimates the distance between m and θ and A is a weighting matrix that 
weights each moment condition. If one writes the equation as an orthogonality condition between 
the residuals of a regression equation: ),,( Xyu   and a set of instrumental variables Z, so that: 
),,(),,,( XyuZZXym    
The OLS is then obtained as a GMM estimator with the orthogonality conditions: 
0)(  XyX . An important aspect of specifying a GMM problem is the choice of a 
weighting matrix A. An optimal A= 
1ˆ  . ˆ  is the estimated covariance matrix of the sample 
moments (m). Consistent TSLS estimates for the initial estimate of θ is used to form the estimate 
of  . 
White’s cross-section heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix for the cross-
section is specified as: )(/1)0(ˆˆ
1
t
T
t
ttw uuZKT 

 where u is the vector of 
residuals and Zt is a k x p matrix such that p moment conditions at (t) may be written as 
),,(),,,( tttttt XyuZZXym    
 
The Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent option is used to correct for both 
autocorrelation and hetereoskedasticity in the data. The following is a specification of this 
option: 




  


1
1
))(ˆ)(ˆ)(,()0(ˆˆ
T
J
HAC jjqjk  
Where 




  


T
jl
tjttjt ZuuzKTj
1
/1)(ˆ  
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (Panel Data) 
 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
RGPDUS 4517.079 860.6690 6278.405 17557.92 7.0562 
RAWEUS 67.8389 39.2614 71.8022 208.1571 1.6868 
RMWUS 39.0143 44.8730 15.6030 65.0492 11.7086 
UE 11.0400 11.2000 3.4637 16.5000 4.6000 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics (Time Series Data) 
Variable Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
RAWE 3453.135 2962.173 3501.190 7727.766 10.5453 
RMW 1386.218 978.2663 1241.669 3200.00 73.7619 
RGDP 28817.32 5686.809 39476.75 110429.3 585.1181 
UE 11.0400 11.2000 3.4636 16.5000 4.6000 
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Figure 1(i): KERNEL DENSITY PLOTS FOR TIME-SERIES DATA (JAMAICA) 
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Figure 1 (ii) 
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Figure 1 (iii) 
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Figure 1 (iv) 
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Figure 2 (i): KERNEL DENSITY GRAPHS FOR THE PANEL DATA 
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Figure 2(ii) 
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Figure 2(iii) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
i
 The GMM and the TSLS methods are similar in that both make use of instrumental variables; however, the 
interpretation of tests of significance are somewhat different. TSLS uses the total number of observations 
multiplied by the TSLS R
2 
(this is the calculated test statistic for the overall model), this is compared with a chi-
square distribution at 5% significance level with l – k degrees of freedom (l is the number of instruments and k is 
the number of parameters). If the tabled chi square value is less than the calculated value, the null hypothesis of 
exogeneity is failed to be accepted. A regression without a constant renders the coefficient of variation useless. In 
contrast, The GMM test statistic for the model is T multiplied by the Hansen’s J-Statistic, if this statistic is less than 
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the chi-square statistic at 5% significance level with l- k degrees of freedom, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. 
